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I. Introduction
Climate change leads to environmental degra-
dation and destruction which have an impact not 
only on natural resources but also human beings. 
Competing livelihood systems are subject to stiff 
competition, leading to social tensions and vio-
lence. In other incidences, environmentally in-
duced migration has contributed to competition 
over shrinking resources in host communities, and 
is a recipe for violence. Droughts and/or floods 
are examples of extreme weather events, which 
are categorized under climate variability and 
characterized by their severe effects on people’s 
livelihoods, especially on agricultural production 
and associated food security. The current drought 
situation in the Horn of Africa is worryingly fa-
miliar, and the situation is deteriorating faster than 
expected. Severely erratic and below average rain-
fall has resulted in widespread food insecurity and 
malnutrition, deteriorating livestock conditions, 
and the mass movement of populations within and 
across borders. 
In this article, focusing on the region around 
Mt. Kilimanjaro, Kenya, the following questions 
are cleared; first, how climate change over a peri-
od of time disrupts the normal functioning of the 
ecosystem that interacts with humans, and affects 
how they access certain vital resources for their 
survival; second, how climate change hazards cre-
ate imbalances in the socio-ecological system that 
have the potential to exacerbate or even trigger vi-
olence in some contexts. 
II.	Africa:	Climate	Change,	Conflict/
Violence	and	Migration/Refugee	
1.	 Climate	Change,	Conflict/Violence	and	Conti-
nental	Migration/Refugee	
Greenpeace Germany mentions that the extent 
of the drought in the Horn of Africa, which cur-
rently threatens the lives of some 20 million peo-
ple in Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan und 
Ethiopia, is reminiscent of the famine in the Sahel 
region in the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, the 
Horn of Africa experienced a prolonged drought 
in 2010 and 2011. The climate in this region is in-
fluenced by fluctuating sea surface temperatures 
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in the Indian Ocean. Similarly to El Niño and La 
Niña in the Pacific, sea surface temperatures off 
the coast of East Africa and Indonesia also oscil-
late between a warm and a cold side. When sea 
surface temperatures off the coast of East Africa 
are cold, less water evaporates and the northeast 
trade winds, which bring rain to the interior of 
the region, are weakened or completely absent 
(Greenpeace Germany: 26–27). 
Droughts on the African continent in recent 
decades have not only become more frequent, but 
also lasted longer. When the intervals between 
recurring droughts become shorter, the ability of 
the population to recover from the most recent 
drought and prepare for new droughts diminish-
es. If extreme climatic events are accompanied by 
violent conflict, as in Yemen, Somalia, and South 
Sudan, then people try to reach refugee camps to 
obtain some degree of protection for themselves 
and their families and to ensure survival through 
food aid (Greenpeace Germany: 26–27; Besada et 
al.; Afifi et al. 2012; Tsuma; Leroy et al.; Cervigni 
et al.).
2. Climate Change, Migration and Human 
Rights	
Since the 1960’s, according to ICCA (Insti-
tute for Climate Change and Adaptation, hereafter 
ICCA), Africa has experienced a general warm-
ing trend with certain regions experiencing more 
warming than others. Kenya has experienced gen-
eral rise in temperatures. Moreover, high evapo-
transpiration rate reduces surface water especially 
in the northern Kenya where pastoral system is 
dominant. Despite the fact that pastoralists have 
been migrating in the past in search of water and 
pastures, conditions have become much tough-
er as the region is prone to frequent episodes of 
droughts forcing them to venture beyond their 
original migration zones. During migration, they 
encounter hostile communities who resist invasion 
in order to protect resources within their borders. 
This has led to incessant conflicts and migrations 
in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) (ICCA: 2). 
Repeated reporting of these conflicts in 
these communities indicates either the absence 
of suitable conflict resolution mechanisms and 
approaches, or their ineffective implementation, 
ICCA continues. Many communities resort to vi-
olence as a way of managing their conflicts with-
out sustainably resolving them. Use of violence 
increases tension between the involved communi-
ties, causing fear among community members and 
inevitably forcing people in particular women, 
children and other vulnerable groups to leave their 
homeland (ICCA: 2). 
Considering that the environment is already 
stressed, ICCA explains, it is most likely that the 
number of conflicts and casualties will increase, 
causing more people to take refuge. However, 
there is still a lot of hesitation by the international 
community to acknowledge the existence of ‘cli-
mate refugees’ and their eligibility to seek asylum. 
Kenya like many other Africa countries is yet to 
ratify the Kampala Convention on Internally Dis-
placed Persons (IDPs). This framework may ad-
dress displacement caused by natural disasters that 
influence human life, peace, stability, security and 
development. Thus, the implementation of such 
frameworks is essential to improving the govern-
ment’s response to the protection needs of IDPs 
(ICCA: 2). 
As such, UNFCCC (United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change) recognizes 
climate change as one of the greatest human rights 
challenge of our time (Human Rights Watch, 
2015). Similarly, Stockholm and the Rio Declara-
tion have acknowledged the link between environ-
mental quality and the human rights (ICCA: 2).
III. Kenya: Climate Change-Induced 
Conflicts	and	Migration
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1.	 General	Remarks	
According to the analysis of ICCA, only 20 
percent of the land in Kenya is arable whilst the 
rest of the country in the northern, north east-
ern and much of the southern areas are arid and 
semi-arid lands (ASALs) which constantly expe-
rience incessant conflicts especially over pasture 
and water resources. These areas experience un-
predictable, non-equilibrium weather conditions. 
Against this background, nomadic pastoralism is 
the dominant livelihood system. Migration as an 
adaptation and coping mechanism leads to com-
petition over the dwindling natural resource base. 
The scarcity results in violent inter-community 
conflicts leading to migration. Lately, there has 
been an increase in migration trends both in space 
and time among pastoralists causing severe com-
petition resulting into conflicts which hinder ac-
cessibility to critical resources. Inter-communal 
conflicts have been exacerbated by dwindling land 
and water resources as well as socio-political, eco-
nomic and cultural factors alongside institutional 
oversights such as drawing communal boundar-
ies without consideration to pastoralist’s mobility 
needs (ICCA: ix; Afifi et al. 2014). 
There is an emerging correlation between cli-
mate variability and violent conflict in Northern 
Kenya, where most conflicts were resource based, 
ICCA continues. Thus, up scaling the findings 
from the two case studies to regional, national or 
elsewhere will be insightful for forward perspec-
tive in the future. It was evident that land use had 
changed significantly as reflected in the species 
composition in both counties’ shrinking forests. 
In addition, precipitation was associated with in-
creased variability as witnessed in the increased 
frequency of droughts over the last 10 year with 
shorter cycles of about 3–5 years. Moreover, we 
can note a correlation between droughts and con-
flicts; these conflicts have led to displacement of 
communities, loss of livelihood and migration. 
Moreover, migration is influenced by the search 
for opportunities and in other instances; there has 
been forced migration due to incessant cycles of 
conflicts (ICCA: ix–x; Masih et al.). 
2.	 Climate	Change	and	Natural	Resource	
Conflicts
The competition for natural resources is the 
root cause of conflicts, ICCA explains. The current 
conflicts and displacements have been reinforced 
by a number of factors and key among them are 
the changing climate regimes. For instance, in 
Wajir and Garissa Counties, climate change has 
dramatically increased the region’s vulnerabili-
ty to droughts and floods. This has imperiled the 
rather fragile livestock based livelihoods and ruled 
out possibilities of sedentary agriculture. Conflicts 
over resources (pasture and water) are on the rise 
as influx of refugees from Somalia intensifies pop-
ulation pressures in the County (ICCA: 13). 
On displacement and migrations, in Turkana 
1,730 people were displaced, in Mandera 125,107 
people were displaced; in Wajir, 84,980 people 
were displaced between January and November 
2014, ICCA mentions. Displacement figures have 
sharply increased due to increase in number and 
frequency of droughts leading to resource based 
clashes. Mandera County has particularly suffered 
from struggle from political representation and its 
proximity to both the Somali and Ethiopian bor-
ders. Although the causes of conflicts differ ac-
cording to the report, a good number of the report-
ed cases include struggles for control and use of 
dwindling resources, in particular water and land 
for pastures. Figures for 2013/14 show that al-
most 500 people in Mandera were killed and more 
than 55,000 people were displaced as a result of 
inter-communal violent conflicts. That means the 
number of people displaced by conflicts in the first 
half of 2014 was almost four times the number of 
people displaced in the entire previous year 2013 
(ICCA: 14–15). 
Areas most affected by inter-communal con-
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flicts in Kenya include semi-arid districts of Turka-
na, Isiolo, Samburu, Wajir, Moyale and Mandera 
in the north of the country, ICCA continues. While 
the traditional causes of conflicts in these areas 
which have mainly been cattle rustling and clan 
or tribal conflicts over political representation, 
recent conflicts are either caused or exacerbated 
by the effects of climate changes which include 
scarcity of water and pastures for pastoral commu-
nities who make the majority of the resident com-
munities in these areas. The Kenyan climatic land 
condition leaves the majority of ASALs’ residents 
susceptible to weather disasters as the climate 
changes over time. In the last decade, frequency 
and severity of natural disasters in Kenya have af-
fected larger numbers of people (ICCA: 15). 
In addition, natural resources (grazing land 
and water) account for a sizeable share in fuel-
ing conflict, ICCA insists. Therefore, clear policy 
guide lines on issues to do with management and 
utilization of water resources are required. Despite 
government taking proactive steps to protect pas-
toralists by deploying more security personnel, its 
effectiveness is not clear (ICCA: 70; Mutimba et 
al.; Agrawala et al.).
IV.	‘Environmental	Refugee’	,	Internation-
al	Human	Rights	Law,	and	Critical	Ex-
planation	of	Non-Linear	Relationship
1.	 Environmental	Refugee	in	International	
Human	Rights	Law
1) Impact of climate change on people’s lives
Whereas it has been demonstrated that phe-
nomena linked to climate change are among the 
main causes of population movement, according 
to Piasentin, it is also true that these people do not 
belong to any well-defined category of subjects of 
international law that can guarantee their protec-
tion. In 2013, people obliged to flee their habitat 
by disasters were almost three times as many as 
those forced to flee their homes by conflicts. In 
2015, 98.6 million people were affected by disas-
ters and, according to UNISDR (United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), 
whose name was changed to UNDRR (United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction) from 
9th May 2019, “Climate was a factor in 92% of 
those events.” The natural disasters producing the 
greatest impact were droughts. In comparison to 
the ten-year annual average, drought rates have 
more than doubled in number, affecting 50.5 mil-
lion people, particularly in Africa. Floods were the 
phenomenon that had the second greatest impact 
in 2015 (Piasentin: 33). 
Scientists agree that climate change in com-
bination with other factors, will cause an increase 
of people displacement in the future, he continues. 
Moreover, according to the IPCC (Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change) report, “Dis-
placement risk increases when populations that 
lack the resources for planned migration experi-
ence higher exposure to extreme weather events, 
in both rural and urban areas, particularly in devel-
oping countries with low income.” It has been re-
ported that 97% of disaster-related displacement, 
between 2008 and 2013, occurred within develop-
ing countries. In addition, climate change is also 
expected to have an indirect impact on increased 
risk of violent conflicts, such as civil war and in-
ter-group violence (Piasentin: 34).
2) Protection of people on the move in inter-
national law
While it is clear that climate change produces 
a serious impact on migration and displacement, 
he analyzes, it is also true that it is quite difficult to 
identify a direct link between the two phenomena. 
The reason is that different communities perceive 
the impacts of climate change differently, depend-
ing on their political, economic and social condi-
tions. Their ability to cope with the same type of 
sudden or slow-onset disaster and their resilience 
are therefore different. This obviously affects peo-
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ple’s mobility decisions. It is more common that 
displaced people affected by a sudden or slow-on-
set disaster stay within the borders of their home 
country. In this case, the state has the obligation, 
under national and international law, to respect 
their rights and to protect them. On the other hand, 
when they move to a foreign country, there is no 
specific legal instrument that regulates how these 
migrants have to be treated for what concerns their 
permission to stay and their protection (Piacentin: 
34–35). 
He continues that refugees are a very precise 
legally-defined category of people including any-
one who, “Owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country.” When a sudden or slow-onset disas-
ter happens, only if the state discriminates against 
some specific group of people in giving assistance, 
those people who do not receive protection can be 
considered as persecuted and therefore entitled 
to international protection. In the same way, if 
the disaster is caused by some action or inaction 
imputable to a discriminatory attitude by the state 
towards a particular group of people, these peo-
ple could fall into the refugee category (Piacentin: 
35). 
However, he adds, migrants who cross borders 
for reasons connected to climate change and can-
not demonstrate persecution by the criteria defined 
in the Convention cannot be considered refugees. 
Even if some decide to live and work in a foreign 
country as a consequence of the impact of climate 
change on their country of origin, it does not mean 
that they are entitled to international protection. In 
addition, the Convention does not guarantee the 
right to be admitted to or stay in a foreign country 
(Piacentin: 35–36). 
Although climate change has divided societ-
ies, it also generated avenues to unify them. Mihr 
mentions that a human rights-based approach to 
climate migration can support the most affected 
communities. ‘Climate justice’ is about how re-
sources, wealth and access to a good quality of 
life are guaranteed under dramatically changing 
conditions that do not stop at borders of any kind. 
It endorses the human rights of people to devel-
opment, freedom and a healthy and sustainable 
environment, and reflects the full spectrum of in-
ternational human rights law (Mihr: 47; The Gov-
ernment Office for Science). 
2.	 Critical	Explorations	of	the	Non-linear	Rela-
tionship	among	Climate	Change,	Migration	
and	Conflict,	and	Catastrophe,	and	Insecurity
Problems of climate change and environmen-
tal damage may be approaching a ‘tipping point’ 
(Higgins et al.).
Agnue explains that climate change will con-
tribute to conflict through several mechanisms, 
with perhaps the most important being increased 
competition between groups over scarce resourc-
es. Such conflict will increase crime and harmful 
acts in a variety of ways (Agnew 34–35). 
White insists that the nation-state remains an 
essential platform for concerted action to deal 
with the causes of environmental harm, as well as 
mitigating the worst symptoms of such harm. But 
the global nature of the problem — climate change 
— means that inevitably our collective survival 
will require planetary cooperation and worldwide 
action. For eco-global criminology, this is best 
undertaken under the guidance of an eco-justice 
framework, rather than protection of existing priv-
ilege or might makes right strategies. For the lat-
ter only lead to further violation of rights, and the 
downward spiral to our mutual destruction (White 
2009: 35; White 2018). 
South mentions that the concept of environ-
mental security is simply stretching the ‘security’ 
umbrella too far because it encompasses and blurs 
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with many other and well-understood aspects of 
security — political, economic and social. Inev-
itably, it is also entwined with social injustice, 
poverty, differential vulnerability, weak political 
structures, population growth, unsustainable econ-
omies, industrialization and resource demand. It 
would be good if we could begin to characterize 
the twenty-first century as one in which we strive 
to preserve both human rights and human security 
but also recognize that such goals cannot be fully 
realized unless we demonstrate similar regard for 
environmental rights and environmental security 
— both now and into the future which subsequent 
generations will inherit (South 2012: 109–111; 
South 2009). 
Burrows and Kinney analyzes that the poten-
tial link between climate change, migration, and 
conflict has been discussed in the academic for 
several decades. However, despite this growing 
concern and focus on climate change and conflict, 
‘uncertainty’ remains regarding the pathways link-
ing climate change to migration to conflict. This 
uncertainty is partly brought about by the inherent 
‘complexity’ of climate change projections. It is 
furthered by the challenges of accurately project-
ing population growth and movements, identify-
ing the outbreak of conflict, and determining the 
significance of climate and migration as drivers of 
conflict relative to other stabilizing or destabiliz-
ing forces. Despite these challenges and inherent 
uncertainty, the potential consequences are so se-
vere that it is essential that further research be con-
ducted to better understand the possible linkages 
between climate change, migration, and conflict 
(Burrows et al.: 1). 
Finally, Baldwin insists that the knowledge 
of climate change, migration and human rights is 
not universal but situated. While climate change 
is a matter of pressing concern, to manage its 
migration effects through human rights law is a 
very particular and thus political undertaking. 
Acknowledging the ‘contingent’ nature of this 
knowledge is important because it allows us to 
widen the terms of responsible action. It allows 
us to pose questions about whether this form of 
knowledge is indeed best suited for managing the 
migration effects of climate change or whether 
other forms of knowledge, such as indigenous 
knowledge, might equally be up to the task. In-
deed, if climate change demands that we ask fun-
damental questions about what it means to live in 
the world today or about what kind of life is possi-
ble as we stand on the threshold of profound glob-
al environmental change, then perhaps answers to 
these questions can be found in the experiences 
of human life and living that are not synonymous 
with what we understand to be modernity today 
(Baldwin: 224; Crank et al.: 89–114). 
V.	 Conclusions
Displacement and migration should be under-
stood as a signal to finally take seriously the fight 
against climate change, to promptly implement 
the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement, and ex-
pedite the phaseout of fossil fuels. There are no 
reliable figures on how many people are suffering 
from long-term displacement and have been liv-
ing, often for years, in the slums of growing cities, 
makeshift camps and emergency shelters. The ma-
jor share of environmental migration takes place in 
the Global South and within national boundaries. 
However, it is difficult to predict how migration 
flows would change if global warming progresses. 
In addition to a further increase in migration, 
the forced immobility of trapped populations is 
likely to increase considerably. These include pop-
ulations whose livelihoods have been destroyed, 
or who are exposed to tremendous risks, but who 
lack the resources to migrate, or have no access 
to escape routes and places of refuge. The current 
humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa and Ye-
men is a frightening example of helplessly trapped 
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populations. The precarious living conditions of 
people who are particular affected by the conse-
quences of climate change and environmental 
degradation show that great efforts must be made 
to better protect them. 
Kenya is already vulnerable to existing cli-
mate variability because of its high-dependency 
on natural resources and low-adaptive capacity to 
cope with climate-related impacts. Building resil-
ience to the impacts of climate change such as fre-
quent or prolonged droughts and flash flooding in 
the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya should have 
been given priority (ICCA: 7). 
At last, we should insist that the real problem 
of international migration and refugee policy is 
not the lack of international statements of intent, 
but rather the behavior of key players. As long as 
the challenge posed by the major transition to a 
post-fossil economy and society has not been rec-
ognized and accepted by everyone, and as long as 
the corresponding changes in behavior of all those 
involved — individuals, groups and states — are 
not addressed more seriously, the planet will con-
tinue to experience natural disasters which do not 
(yet) affect some of us, but bring great suffering to 
the poorest of the poor who are the least to blame 
for their occurrence. We can simply no longer af-
ford to continue to underestimate and ignore these 
catastrophic events. 
[Notes]
1) This article is based on the paper titled “Drought or 
Flood (Climate Change) – Social-ecological Sys-
tem Destabilization – Conflict Nexus in East Africa: 
Rainfall-induced Environmental Degradation, Food 
Insecurity, Migration and Violence around and near 
Mt. Kilimanjaro” and presented at the 18th Annual 
Conference of the European Society of Criminology, 
29 August – 1 September 2018, Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
2) This article is a part of research results of “Research 
on Environmental- and Eco-crimes by Progress of 
Scientific Technologies and Development of Societ-
ies and Measures against Them 2015–2019” (Sub-
ject Number: 15K03181) supported by the Grant-in-
Aid of Scientific Research by Japanese Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
3) In order to make a research on ‘current situation of 
climate change-induced environmental degradation, 
food insecurity, migration and violence around and 
near Mt. Kilimanjaro’, the author visited the relevant 
places: Masai Mara National Reserve, Amboseli Na-
tional Park, The Institute for Climate Change and 
Adaptation at University of Nairobi, etc. in August 
2018.
4) I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues 
for their help: Professor Shem O. Wandiga (Univer-
sity of Nairobi) and members of his research group.
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